




Copyright @ 2018 
Australian and New Zealand Journal of European Studies 
https://cesaa.org.au/anzjes/ 
Vol10 (3) 
ISSN 1837-2147 (Print) 
ISSN 1836-1803 (On-line) 
 
 
Serbia’s relations with its Western Balkan neighbours as a 
challenge for its accession to the EU 
Milenko Petrovic 
University of Canterbury 
milenko.petrovic@canterbury.ac.nz  
Garth Wilson 
University of Canterbury 
garth.wilson@canterbury.ac.nz  
Abstract 
Serbia, as the second regional frontrunner (after Montenegro) in the EU accession process, hopes to 
be able to meet the required conditions and join the EU by 2025 which the European Commission 2018 
enlargement strategy declared as the earliest possible date for the admission of new EU members. 
However, some of the EU’s expectations and requirements which Serbia has to meet, particularly those 
regarding the ‘normalisation’ of its relations with Kosovo and the resolution of ‘bilateral disputes’ 
which it has with some other neighbours, seem to be very tough and challenging for the Serbian 
government. The article discusses the recent developments in Serbia’s relations with its ‘most 
problematic’ neighbours and critically assesses the strength of problems in these relations as an 
obstacle for Serbia’s accession to the EU. The article shows that thanks to EU assistance and the 
commitment of interested parties to find a common ground, Serbia’s relations with Kosovo may 
become even less of an obstacle to its accession than its relations with its three western neighbours, 
particularly Croatia. 
Keywords: Serbia’s accession, neighbourhood relations, problems, Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Croatia, Montenegro 
There are obvious differences in the quality of political relations that successive 
governments of post-Milosevic Serbia have been able to establish and maintain with 
Serbia’s regional neighbours over the last two decades. While general political (and 
socio-economic) relations between Serbia and all of its neighbours to the north and 
east – Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria – and with post-Yugoslav Macedonia1 to the 
south can be assessed as good (or even very good) with no open issues and problems,2 
quite the opposite can be said for the country’s relations with its remaining neighbours. 
                                                      
1 It is solely for reasons of clarity, and without any attempt to connect on the nearly thirty year long ‘name debate’ 
with Greece (which seems to be finally concluding at the time of writing in September 2018)  that this country is 
referred to as ‘Macedonia’ in this paper and not the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYRM) which is (still) 
in official use by the UN, international organisations and those states which accept Greek argument in this debate 
(for more detail on this debate see e.g. Geddes and Taylor, 2016 and Tzallas, 2018).  
2 At particular occasions the question of the status of the Hungarian or Romanian ethnic minorities in Serbia has 
been raised by some politicians (less so governments). However it has never posed a serious problem in Serbia’s 
relations with either of these countries in the last two decades (see e.g. comment in Markovic’s contribution to this 
issue regarding Romania’s complaints about the treatment of the Vlach/Romanian minority in Serbia).  
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Although they have generally improved over the period since the end of the civil wars 
in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (B-H) in 1995, and particularly since the early 
2000s and the ‘second’ democratisation of Croatia and Serbia, 3  Serbia’s bilateral 
relations with its neighbours to the west (Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Montenegro) and particularly south-west (Kosovo) are still fragile and subject to 
various challenges. Mainly rooted in the legacy of the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia, 
particularly the different interpretations of the causes of the ethnic conflicts in Croatia, 
B-H and Kosovo and their scope and consequences (see e.g. Cohen, 1995; Lampe, 1996; 
Woodward, 1995) problems in relations with these neighbours are of significant 
importance with respect to both Serbia’s general political security and stability, and as 
a condition for its accession to the EU.  
While the EU clearly stated when Serbia was granted candidate status for membership 
in March 2012, that the cornerstone of its accession would be the ‘normalisation’ of its 
(officially not existing) relations with Kosovo and its “commitment and progress … in 
the [EU facilitated] Belgrade-Pristina dialogue” (EU General Affairs Council, 2012, p. 
1), Serbia’s problems with its three western neighbours are also an important part of 
its accession agenda. Somewhat paradoxically, thanks to some progress made in the 
‘Belgrade-Pristina dialogue,’ Serbia’s relations with Kosovo may become even less of 
an obstacle to its EU accession than its relations with its three western neighbours. 
Despite formally established diplomatic relations with Croatia, B-H and Montenegro, 
Serbia’s relations with these three successor states of former Yugoslavia can be 
characterised as more ‘problematic’ or ‘difficult’ than normal. Particularly worrying are 
the perpetually difficult relations between Serbia’s political elite and the political 
leaders of the ethnic Bosniaks in B-H and the significant worsening of bilateral 
relations between Serbia and Croatia in recent years. 
Although primarily resulting from the interplay of domestic factors which are 
addressed in greater detail in the next section, this can also be seen as an outcome (or 
‘by-product’) of the EU’s prioritisation of policies which have targeted short-term 
political stability and security in its neighbourhring countries by relying on (and often 
contributing to the rise of) non-democratic political practices and authoritarian leaders 
rather than consolidation of democracy in these countries (Bieber, 2018; Juncos and 
Whitman, 2015; Pomorska and Noutcheva, 2017; Kovacevic, this issue). As the latter 
is closely accompanied by populism, nationalism and the increased animosities 
towards the other ethnic groups, all of which has characterised relations between 
Serbia and its three western neighbours over the last decade, the EU’s safe-guard 
‘security approach’ can also be considered a contributing factor to the troublesome 
state of these relations. Its involvement and partial responsibility did not, however, 
prevent the EU from asking Serbia and their Western Balkan neighbours to ‘clean up 
their mess’ and, as outlined in the ‘Enlargement strategy’ of February 2018 to solve all 
their ‘bilateral disputes … as a matter of urgency’ (European Commission 2018a, p. 7) 
if they want to advance towards EU membership. This may appear to be particularly 
demanding for Serbia and its accession bid not only on account of the ‘Kosovo issue’. 
After providing an overview and critical assessment of the current state of play in 
Serbia’s relations with Kosovo (in Section 1) and the three other above mentioned post-
                                                      
3 After the death of Croatia’s authoritarian president Tudjman in December 1999 and the overthrow of Serbia’s post-






Yugoslav states, this article evaluates the strength of these problems as an obstacle for 
Serbia’s accession to the EU in the final section.  
Serbia and Kosovo 
Although it may be argued that moderate progress has been achieved in relations 
between Kosovo and Serbia over the years that followed the launch of the EU facilitated 
‘Belgrade-Pristina dialogue’ in Brussels in 2011, and particularly following the 
adoption of the Brussels Agreement in April 2013,4 official relations between Serbia 
and Kosovo are still non-existent. Ten years since the biggest world powers in the West 
(USA, Germany, France, Italy and the UK) decided to recognise Kosovo’s 
independence and asked other countries in the world to follow suit, Serbia continues 
to refuse to do so and finds support for this among the two non-western members of 
the UN Security Council – Russia and China – and over 80 members of the UN 
(including five member states of the EU) who have not yet recognised the 
independence of this former province of communist Serbia. Despite Serbia’s positive 
response to the EU’s request (or more precisely ‘ultimatum’) to either improve 
relations with the Kosovo government (run almost exclusively by ethnic Albanians who 
comprise over 90 per cent of Kosovo’s population) or to ‘forget’ about its accession to 
the EU and its acceptance to open the above mentioned ‘Dialogue’ with the government 
in Pristina in 2011,5  the relationship between the two parties remains very tense. 
Although the parties agreed at the Brussels talks to establish some official 
communication,6  this is mainly conducted via the EU’s and UN civil and military 
missions in Kosovo7 and has been marked with frequent incidents, some of which (as 
illustrated below) were on the brink of inciting an open and violent crisis. Moreover, 
the very interpretation of the obligations of the two parties regarding the 
implementation of the Agreement provides a new source of disputes between them.  
While consecutive Serbian governments have until very recently presented the 
adoption of the Brussels Agreement as a ‘great victory’ of Serbian diplomacy, which 
was able to secure written and internationally recognised (by virtue of the fact that it 
was adopted under EU sponsorship) guarantees for the political autonomy of the 
Serbian ethnic minority in Kosovo, the vague content and ‘semi-official’ character of 
the agreement (Crisis Group, 2013) have in fact ‘guaranteed’ very little. Particularly the 
implementation of the first six (of 15) short points of the agreement which regulate the 
most important concession for the Serbian side: the establishment and functioning of 
an “Association/Community of Serb majority municipalities in Kosovo" has become 
                                                      
4 It is interesting that it was only initialled and never signed by the two prime ministers (see e.g. Crisis Group, 2013).  
The agreement in full is available at: http://www.kryeministriks.net/repository/docs/FIRST_-
AGREEMENT_OF_PRINCIPLES_GOVERNING_THE_NORMALIZATION_OF_RELATIONS,_APRIL_19,_201
3_BRUSSELS_en.pdf.  
5 When the European Council in December 2011 decided not to follow (for the first time in the history of the EU’s 
eastern enlargement) the recommendation of the European Commission to grant official candidate status to an 
applicant country, the only reason was Serbia’s unsatisfactory progress ‘in the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue”. Again, 
after Serbia had ‘improved itself” and had ‘show[n] credible commitment and achieved further progress in…the 
Belgrade-Pristina dialogue; (EU General Affair Council, 2012. p. 1) it was granted official candidate status at the 
next European Council in March 2012. 
6 Kosovo and Serbia have agreed to exchange liaison officers although their assigned role is highly ambiguous 
(Barlovac, 2013). 
7  The United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) established by Security Council 
resolution 1244 for ensuring peace and security after the NATO intervention against the Milosevic regime (bombing 
of Serbia and Montenegro) was terminated in June 1999 and the European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) 
was established in 2008 for supporting and supervising the work of Kosovo police and legal institutions (for more 
details see Fakiolas and Tzifakis, 2017 and Petrovic, 2017). 
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problematic. While the Kosovo government and even more so the nationalist 
opposition have from the very beginning been very reluctant to implement this part of 
the Agreement, the Kosovo Constitutional Court declared in 2015 that all (vital) parts 
of the Agreement which grant autonomous executive rights to the Association of Serb 
municipalities "are not entirely in compliance with the spirit of the [Kosovo] 
constitution" and that the Association should be established taking this into account 
(Deutsche Welle, 2015). Although the other parts of the Agreement, particularly those 
which regulate the incorporation of the Serbian Police forces and the judicial system in 
Serb dominated northern Kosovo into integrated Kosovo structures (points 7-10)8 as 
well as point 14 which is the only one ‘explicitly about bilateral relations’ (Crisis Group, 
2013)9 have so far been more or less fully implemented, the unresolved formal status 
of the three Serb controlled municipalities in Northern Kosovo 10  has remained a 
‘regular source’ of accusations and counter-accusations between the two parties. 
Since the Brussels talks effectively stalled in 2016 due to the above outlined request 
from the Kosovo Albanian side for the revision of the first part of the Brussels 
agreement and Serbia’s strong rejection of it, tensions and nationalist rhetoric have 
seriously increased and have been evident in numerous incidents. Among these, 
especially inflammatory were the arrest of the high-ranked Kosovo politician, former 
and current Prime Minister Haradinaj in France on 4 January 2017 (based on Serbia’s 
arrest warrant for alleged war crimes) that was followed by the adoption of the Kosovo 
Parliament resolution that demanded the suspension of the Brussels talks until he was 
released (Emini and Stakic, 2018).11 The departure of a ‘Kosovo is Serbia’ train from 
Belgrade for north Mitrovica in north Kosovo only two days after Haradinaj was 
released from the French prison is also noteworthy. Eventually the train, whose 
carriages were painted in the colours of the Serbian national flag and the message 
‘Kosovo is Serbia’ in 21 different languages was stopped by the ‘direct order’ of Prime 
Minister Vučić before it reached the Kosovo border (Morina, 2017). All three events 
enormously increased tensions between the two parties. The tensions again reached 
boiling point in early 2018 with the (still unresolved) assassination of the independent 
Serb politician Oliver Ivanović in North Mitrovica on 16 January for which both sides 
have been accusing each other (Ciric, 2018; Emini and Stakic, 2018) and with the 
theatrical arrest and quick release (dramatically reported in the media) of the head of 
the Serbian Government office for Kosovo, Marko Djurić in the same city on 26 March 
during his non-authorised (by the Kosovo government’s interpretation) visit to north 
Kosovo. 12  More recently, in early August 2018 Serbian President Vučić called an 
‘urgent’ meeting of the national Security Council and wrote an open letter to Kosovo 
Serbs to assure them that although Kosovo Albanians will ‘not lift a finger to establish 
the promised Association of Serb Majority Municipalities in Kosovo … Serbia is ready 
                                                      
8 Subject to the condition that these would continue to be run by Kosovo Serbs (as specified in points 9 and 10 of 
the Agreement). 
9 It states that ‘neither side will block … the other side’s progress in their respective EU paths’.  
10 The Brussels Agreement has in fact helped the Serbian government (as it was in this regard supported and assisted 
by both the Kosovo government and the EU/international actors) to put under its ultimate control all the so called 
‘parallel institutions’ in northern Kosovo and eliminate all alternative (and genuinely) autonomous political options 
and organisations of Kosovo Serbs (see e.g. Emini and Stakic, 2018). 
11 Although he was quickly released from prison (on 12 January) he was not allowed to leave France until the court 
made a decision regarding his requested extradition to Serbia. The request was finally rejected on 27 April 2017 
when Haradinaj was allowed to leave to Kosovo which sparked outrage in Serbia where then Prime Minister (and 
current President) Aleksandar Vučić called the ruling ‘a great victory for criminals’ (Radio Free Europe, 2017). 
12 One of the agreed issues at the Brussels talks which were not included in the 2013 Agreement was the procedure 
governing the visits of Serbia’s officials to Serbian enclaves in north (and other areas of) Kosovo which however was 





to fulfil its obligation to [them] and protect [their] lives and [their] peace, if necessary’ 
(Deutsche Welle, 2018b; Rudic, 2018). 
However, it seems that the main purpose of all of these incidents and even more so the 
ultra-nationalist rhetoric which accompanied them was, particularly on the Serbian 
side, set the scene for a more robust governmental attempt to find a lasting 
‘compromise solution’ for the Kosovo ‘knot’ which would be ‘not easy and painless’ (for 
the wider Serbian public) as Vučić stated just a few days after he sent the above letter 
to Kosovo Serbs (B92net, 2018). In trying to find a ‘compromise’ by which Serbia would 
get ‘something concrete in return’ for de facto (or de jure) recognition of Kosovo’s 
independence (Walker, 2018) through signing the ‘legally binding agreement’ with 
Kosovo requested by the EU (European Commission, 2018b; see also the Introduction 
to this issue) Vučić has used strong ‘anti-Kosovo’ rhetoric in an attempt to weaken the 
opposition that his ‘compromise’ has received from the (ultra) nationalist political 
parties and some intellectual circles in Serbia. Particularly problematic for him in this 
respect is the firm rejection of any ‘idea’ of a ‘separation of Kosovo from Serbia’ that 
has come from the high authorities of the influential Serbian Orthodox Church (see e.g. 
B92net/Tanjug, 2018a and Blic, 2018). Nevertheless, Vučić’s ‘compromise solution’, 
whose main points (as recently unveiled) are the alteration of current borders between 
Kosovo and Serbia (Gotev, 2017; Politico, Aug 2018;) 13  and securement of an 
exterritorial status for the Serbian monasteries in Kosovo (and perhaps some limited, 
mainly cultural autonomy for a few Serbian enclaves which will remain in Kosovo) is 
strongly supported by the party base of Vučić’s own Serbian Progressive Party (SPP) 
and its main partner in the ruling coalition – the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS)14 and 
some other smaller parties and NGOs in the domestic political scene. Furthermore it 
has also started to ‘gain momentum’ at the international scene in recent months and 
weeks. While Kosovo’s President Thachi has sent signals about his readiness to 
consider it, the above outlined ‘compromise’ has also been positively perceived by the 
main EU representatives in the Brussels talk and by the current US administration 
which has been one of the major and most influential international supporters of 
Kosovo independence (Politico, 2018; Rettman, 2018). However, while Thachi faces 
very strong domestic opposition in this regard, the leaders of other influential 
international players and EU member states, particularly the UK and Germany, have 
so far also been reluctant to consider any deal between the two parties which would 
include a ‘redraw of borders’ that could be taken as precedent for other states with 
similar issues (Rettman, 2018). 
Nevertheless at the August (2018) talks in Vienna between Vučić and Thachi which 
were organised by the Austrian government (which holds the EU Presidency until the 
end of 2018) and the EU’s Commissioner for European Neighbourhood Policy and 
Enlargement, Hahn, all actors involved – the two Balkan Presidents and their EU hosts 
– expressed optimism regarding the possibility of reaching a mutually acceptable 
compromise (Viena.At, 2018; Politico, 2018). Time will show whether this optimism 
will indeed lead to an early resolution of the ‘Kosovo knot’ and a less problematic 
Serbia-Kosovo relationship.  
                                                      
13 By which three Serb municipalities in north Kosovo will be swapped for one Albanian dominantly populated 
municipality in southern Serbia. 
14 Its leader, current Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Dacic was indeed the first high ranked Serbian 
official who publicly announced the idea of ‘delimitation’ as a possible solution of the Kosovo-Serbia problem 
(Gotev, 2017). 
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Serbia and its post-Yugoslav neighbours to the west 
If there is reason for being cautiously optimistic in viewing the prospect of resolving 
the Kosovo challenge to Serbia’s accession within the short to medium term, recent 
developments and trends in Serbia’s relations with its three western neighbours do not 
seem as promising. Although the character of these relations is definitely less 
challenging for Serbia’s EU ambitions than that with Kosovo, the fact that the EU 
recently adopted the above mentioned additional accession condition that the Western 
Balkan candidates for EU membership must solve their ‘bilateral disputes … as a 
matter of urgency,’ and that Serbia currently has many such disputes with its three 
western neighbours may also pose a serious obstacle on its way to EU membership. 
This is particularly noteworthy with regard to Serbia’s continuously worsening 
relations and increasing (instead of, as could be expected decreasing) number of 
disputes on various issues with Croatia, which is an EU member state and as such able 
to block or at least slow down progress in Serbia’s accession negotiations. As will be 
shown below, Croatia’s officials and political representatives have not hesitated to 
make such attempts on several occasions so far.  
Montenegro 
Although they have not been cordial since the time when the Montenegrin political 
leader and Prime Minister Djukanovic refused to obey Serbian ruler Milosevic (then 
the president of ‘smaller’ Yugoslavia which comprised only Serbia and Montenegro) in 
the late 1990s, 15  relations between Serbia and Montenegrin officials worsened 
considerably in the early 2000s when the Djukanovic government largely boycotted 
the work of (a few) central institutions of the ‘State Community of Serbia and 
Montenegro’ established by the EU sponsored agreement in 2002. 16  Being only 
genuinely interested in full separation from Serbia and the re-establishment of 
‘Montenegrin statehood,’ Djukanovic was not interested in any serious cooperation 
with the pro-reform and pro-EU ruling political elite in post-Milosevic Serbia, and was 
only waiting for the three required years (as defined by the establishing agreement of 
the ‘state community’) to pass before he could call a referendum for Montenegro’s 
independence (Massari, 2005; Petrovic, 2013). Since the Djukanovic pro-
independence bloc scored a narrow victory in the 2006 referendum, the country has 
remained sharply divided between the ‘separatist’ or ‘Montenegrin’ Djukanović led 
ruling coalition, and the mainly ‘unionist’ and proSerbian opposition which have 
unsuccessfully been trying to remove Djukanović from power (Džankić, 2014).17 
                                                      
15  In addition to ignoring Milosevic’s instructions regarding Montenegrin internal affairs, he also separated 
Montenegro’s economy from  the Yugoslav central bank and, with Germany’s blessing, introduced  the Deutsche 
mark in 1999 (and from 2002 the euro) to be the Montenegrin currency  (see e.g. Deutche Welle, 2013 for more 
details). 
16 The agreement for the foundation of the common state titled ‘state community,’ which had a common Army and 
common foreign policy as de facto the only genuine common institutions) was signed under the presence and 
supervision of the European Union High Representative for CFSP Javier Solana on 14 March 2002 and 
subsequently adopted by the parliaments of both republics and the federal parliament on 4 February 2003 as “The 
Constitutional Charter of the State Community of Serbia and Montenegro” (see Petrovic, 2013 for more details). 
17 Montenegro is the only post-communist state in Europe which has never experienced an electoral change of ruling 
party or leader. The Democratic Party of Montenegrin Socialists (formerly the League of Montenegrin Communists) 
and its leader, Milo Djukanovic have been in power throughout the whole period of post-communist (and even the 
last few years of communist) history of the country. Djukanović himself has served six terms as prime minister and 
two as president of the country during this period. He is the current President of the country, elected in the election 
held on 18 May 2018 (for more details about his rule see e.g. Deutsche Welle, 2018a; Hopkins, 2012; Tomovic, 





The Serbian government immediately accepted the results of the referendum (despite 
the very narrow results and numerous complaints about the irregularity of the 
referendum process launched by the defeated unionist bloc 18 ), and recognised 
Montenegro’s independence twelve days after it was officially declared on 3 June 2006 
(Canas, 2007). Nevertheless, divisions between ‘separatists’ and ‘unionists’, alongside 
the status of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Montenegro,19 have remained the largest 
source of problems in relations between the two countries following their peaceful 
separation. On several occasions domestic political developments have directly 
affected (or at least threatened to affect) Montenegro’s (i.e. Djukanović’s) relations 
with Serbia’s officials. The most recent incident occurred on the very day of the last 
Montenegrin parliamentary election held on 16 October 2016 when the news broke 
that the Montenegrin police had arrested 20 Serbian nationals, led by two Russians, 
who were preparing a ‘coup’ against the Montenegrin government and (then) Prime 
Minister Djukanović. Although the government prosecutor was not very convincing in 
trying to connect the alleged plotters with the leaders of the (then united bloc of) 
Montenegrin opposition, who lost the election by only one parliamentary seat and 
unanimously claimed that the story of the ‘coup’ was fabricated by the Djukanovć 
government in order to create confusion among voters, and secure its hold on power 
(Tomovic, 2016), the event itself could easily have been taken as a ‘notorious example’ 
of Serbia’s interference in Montenegrin domestic affairs. However, the government’s 
hesitance to accuse official Serbia for involvement in the ‘incident’ (blaming instead 
‘criminal groups’ from Russia, Serbia and Montenegro) 20  and the assistance the 
Serbian government provided in deporting some suspects to Montenegro (Guardian, 
2016a) seemed to have heralded (slightly) better days for the relationship between the 
two countries. Official relations between Serbia and Montenegro actually started to 
slightly improve several years ago after the governing coalition led by the Serbian 
Progressive Party (SPP) of (current) President Vučić came to power in Serbia in 2012  
and after Djukanović paid an official visit to Serbia in 2013, for the first time in ten 
years (Prime Minister’s Office, 2013).21 Although some recent statements made by 
Djukanović have maintained that this improvement might be more cosmetic than real 
(Blic and Tanjug, 2018), it is hard to imagine that relations between these two countries 
could in the foreseeable future worsen beyond a ‘normal level of tensions’ so that they 
would pose a serious challenge for Serbia’s accession.  
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia  
While Serbia’s relations with Montenegro during the last two decades could be 
described as ‘traditionally problematic’, but ‘less dramatic’ over the last years, it could 
be said that the level of drama in ‘traditionally difficult’ Serbia’s relations with the 
                                                      
18 According to official results the Djukanović bloc got 55.5 per cent, only 0.5 per cent above the agreed threshold 
of 55 per cent for declaring independence. There were 210 complaints from the unionist opposition about the 
referendum process, all of which were quickly rejected by the EU appointed chairman of the referendum 
commission (Friis, 2007). 
19 The conflict between the supporters of the Serbian Orthodox Church (which dominates the country’s religious 
landscape), and the followers of the Montenegrin Orthodox Church (which was founded in 1993 and is still not 
canonically recognised)   basically reflects and is rooted in the political conflict between the pro-Serb unionist 
opposition and the independent (or former ‘separatist’) ruling bloc (for more details see ESI, 2007; Zdravkovski 
and Morrison, 2014; Džankić, 2014). 
20 Including also an ex-CIA officer (Guardian, 2018b).  
21 However, many in the Serbian opposition, but also some independent analysts (see e.g. Ciric, 2018) claim that 
Serbian President Vučić sees a role model in Djukanovic’s long-term rule over Montenegro and that he actually tries 
to copy Djukanovic’s authoritarianism in Serbia. Nevertheless, according to Freedom House and TICI (see Table in 
the Introduction) both countries are (still) considered semi-consolidated democracies and are ‘more democratised’ 
than any of their Western Balkan neighbours. 
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Croatian government and the Bosnia political leadership in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
has not declined, but rather increased since 2012. Moreover, it may be argued that 
relations between the Serbian and Croatian governments have deteriorated in the last 
few years and are the worst since the end of the Croatian war in 1995. 
Most of the problems in Serbia’s relations with Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina 
essentially derive from a different interpretation of the events that led to the collapse 
of the former Yugoslavia and the outbreak of ethnic conflicts and wars afterwards, as 
well as the outcomes of these wars. Problems in official relations between Serbia and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina are primarily caused by disputes and conflicts that exist in 
relations between political leaders of ethnic Bosniaks (or Bosnian Muslims) and 
Bosnian Serbs who fought on opposite sides during the B-H civil war 1992-1995 and 
who now live separated into two entities of the de facto confederative state.22 On the 
other hand, the core issue in political relations between modern day Serbia and Croatia 
relates to different and mutually disputed interpretations of the responsibility of their 
respective governments for both the breakout of the Croatian war (1991-1995)23 and 
the handling of the outcomes and legacies of this war. 
Hence, a cooling of relations between Serbia (including the Bosnian Serbs in Republika 
Srpska) and the Bosniak political leadership in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the political 
elite in Croatia occurs each year, on the anniversary of two events which occurred 
during the Croatian and Bosnian civil wars (within a period of less than three weeks). 
The first of these was the mass killing of seven to eight thousand imprisoned Bosniak 
men and boys and the expulsion of more than 20,000 civilians from the Srebrenica 
region in east Bosnia by Bosnian Serb military and paramilitary forces in mid-July 
1995, later defined by the International Court of Justice in Paris as “acts of genocide.” 
(ICJ, 2007, p. 127). The second event relates to the offensive of the Croatian army 
(known as “Operation Storm”) in early August 1995 against rebel ethnic Serbs during 
which some 200,000 Serb civilians left their homes in the Krajina region to be 
displaced as refugees in Serbia or in a much smaller number in the Republika Srpska‘s 
part of Bosnia-Herzegovina. While Serbian politicians in Serbia and particularly 
Republika Srpska continue to irritate their Bosniak counterparts by recognising the 
“horrible crime” but not the “genocidal character” of the Srebrenica massacre (see e.g. 
VOA News, 2015 and Reuters, 2015) the official Croatian celebration of Operation 
Storm as a public holiday (‘Victory Day’) on 5 August each year is perceived in Serbia, 
and particularly by official Serbian politicians and refugees from Croatia, as a cynical 
celebration of Croatia’s ‘ethnic cleansing’. In recent years, relations between the ruling 
political elites in Serbia and their two neighbours in the west particularly worsened 
during the ceremonies marking the 20th anniversary of both events in 2015. The highly 
fraught relations between Serbia and the Bosniak leadership reached their lowest point 
after Russia (at Serbia’s request) vetoed the British proposal for a UN resolution 
defining the Srebrenica massacre as a “genocide” in early July and then just a few days 
later the Serbian Prime Minister Vučić was attacked by the crowd while attending the 
                                                      
22 After the war was terminated by the Dayton Peace Accords of November 1995 (which were formally signed as ‘The 
General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina’ in Paris on 14 December 1995)  Bosnia and 
Herzegovina was established as a de facto confederative state consisting of two semi-independent entities - the 
‘Republika Srpska (RS)’ and ‘the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina’ (i.e. the Bosniak-Croat entity) - with a 
feeble (con)federal Bosnian-Herzegovinian government (the agreement is available in full at 
http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/BA_951121_DaytonAgreement.pdf). 
23 This was the war that the Croatian police (and later army) waged against the remnants of the Yugoslav federal 
army and the rebelling Croatian Serbs in the early 1990s which ended in August 1995 by so-called ‘Operation Storm’ 





Srebrenica anniversary ceremony. 24  However, while relations between the Vučić 
government in Belgrade and the Bosniak political leadership returned to normal (or 
“its usual level of difficulty”) during the visit of the B-H Presidency to Belgrade on 23 
July that same year, Serbo-Croatian relations had begun to go from bad to worse even 
before the 2015 celebration of 5 August (see e.g. Mikelic, 2015; B92net, 2015 and 
B92net/Tanjug, 2015) and have continued in the same direction to the present day.  
Having never been more than ‘moderately controversial’, official relations between the 
Serbian and Croatian governments started to significantly deteriorate after the 2012 
Serbian parliamentary and presidential elections which were won by the reformed and 
“Europeanised” former nationalist allies of the Serbian post-communist dictator 
Milosević. After former President Tadić had succeeded alongside his Croatian 
counterpart Josipović to significantly improve (or at least normalise) relations between 
the two countries during his second mandate (2008–2012), his successors President 
Nikolić (2012-2017) and his party deputy and the country President since 2017 
Aleksndar Vučić from the Serbian Progressive Party (SPP) 25   struggled to build 
relations and gain trust from both President Josipović and the centre-left Croatian 
government of Prime Minister Milanović. Nothing changed when Josipovic was 
replaced by president Grabar-Kitarović after the Croatian presidential election in 2015, 
but bilateral relations between the two largest post-Yugoslav states worsened further 
after the centre-right HDZ of President Grabar-Kitarović won the extraordinary 
parliamentary election in September 2016 and the coalition government was formed 
the following month. The Plenković government, which is still in power (September 
2018), has continued to tolerate (and sometimes support) the nationalistic rhetoric 
and activities of various groups and individuals who have glorified (particularly during 
some public events, anniversaries and commemorations) the victorious ‘Domovinski 
rat’ (Homeland War)26 of the early 1990s and “Operation Storm”, while at the same 
time denouncing allegations of historical revisionism and injustice related to the fascist 
Ustasha movement and Croatia’s Nazi puppet regime during the Second World War. 
Croatian Serbs (and even more so those who left in 1995) and the Serbian political and 
wider public were particularly irritated when in November 2016, the slogan of the 
Ustasha movement, ‘Za dom spremni’ [‘For the Homeland ready’] was inscribed on a 
plaque near the Jasenovac concentration camp in which tens of thousands Serbs were 
killed during WWII,27 without a resolute condemnation by the Croatian government 
which needed ten months to remove the plaque (Mikelic, 2017a and 2017b). On the 
other hand, some high ranking politicians and media commentators in Serbia, 
particularly the leader of the oppositional Serbian Radical Party, Šešelj, who was 
convicted by the International Court in The Hague for war crimes (mainly committed 
against Croatian civilians), and the country’s Minister of Defence, Vulin, have tried 
very hard to ‘keep pace’ with rising nationalism and anti-Serbism in Croatia. On many 
occasions since he was released from the Hague Tribunal in early 2015, Šešelj has been 
‘successful’ in widely publicising ‘his hatred’ of the modern Croatian state which he 
                                                      
24 When he came to pay tribute to the victims and “condemn this horrible crime” (BBCNews, 2015b). 
25 It was created as a national, centre-right and pro-EU(ropean) party by these two politicians in 2008, after  they 
left the ultranationalist Serbian Radical Party of (then) the ICTY indictee Vojislav Šešelj. 
26 The phrase used in Croatia for the 1991-1995 war.    
27 According to official (communist) Yugoslav figures (supported by some Serbian authors) over 700,000 people, 
mostly Serbs, were killed in this Ustasha concentration camp. However, more recent serious studies agree that more 
realistic figures are much lower, but still significant and they refer to between 83,000 and 100,000 victims of the 
Jasenovac camp, of which there were 50 to 60,000 Serbs (Zerjavić, 1989; Pavlowitch, 2008).   
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identifies with the WWII Ustasha regime,28 whereas Minister Vulin has also issued 
similar statements and made other provocations towards the Croatian government for 
which he was banned from coming to Jasenovac in April 2018 to pay tribute to the 
victims of Ustasha’s terror. Vulin commented that the ban was a ‘provocation’ and 
stated that ‘[t]he most horrible truth about Jasenovac is not only what happened there, 
but the fact that Croatia today will not show remorse for what it had done’ (HINA, 
2018).29 The Serbian government’s decision to reciprocally declare Croatia’s Minister 
of Defence a persona non grata in Serbia was another contributory factor to the 
deterioration of the relationship between the two countries, as were several bitter 
diplomatic notes exchanged regarding these (and some other) incidents over the last 
few years (see e.g. Rudic, 2018). Although the Croatian political leadership eventually 
decided not to recall their ambassador in Belgrade after the reciprocal bans against the 
two defence ministers (N1, 2018), current relations between the two countries can 
hardly be considered any better than in 2015 when Croatia indeed recalled their 
ambassador in Belgrade (after Šešelj publicly set on fire the Croatian flag).  
What problems do Serbia’s relations with its neighbours pose for 
its accession? 
As discussed in the two previous sections, Serbia’s relations (or non-relations) with 
Kosovo have been declared crucial for the successful completion of its accession to the 
EU and they are as such incorporated into one of the 35 accession negotiation chapters 
(number 35 – ‘other issues’) which must be successfully completed, i.e. ‘closed’ before 
Serbia can be declared ready to join the EU. Although the two sides still have numerous 
problems to resolve and are quite far away from a final deal, recent progress in 
narrowing the gap regarding the content of the ‘binding agreement’, combined with 
their mutually strong interest to reach an acceptable ‘compromise’ may in fact make 
the ‘Kosovo knot’ less of a problem for Serbia’s accession than the (at first sight more 
trivial) issues that it has with other neighbours. Indeed, Serbia’s relations with its three 
neighbours to the west, primarily Croatia, are also ‘rich’ with many problems that 
might create obstacles on Serbia’s path to EU membership.   
While Serbia’s relations with Montenegro and the Bosniak political leadership in B-H 
have in general been problematic since the establishment of these two states in 2006 
and 1995, respectively, there is not much evidence of a significant decline over the 
years. Moreover, as referred to in Section 2, Serbia’s official relations with Montenegro 
have even shown some (very modest) signs of improvement in recent years. On the 
other hand, after they reached their lowest point in early July 2015 with regards to both 
the failed British proposal for a UN resolution on the ‘Srebrenica genocide’ and an 
attack on the Serbian president by the crowd while he was attending the Srebrenica 
anniversary ceremony a few days later, relations between the Serbian government and 
the Bosniak politicians are once again no more more problematic than usual. Although 
the president of Republika Srpska, Dodik has on many occasions annoyed the Bosniak 
                                                      
28 Among these particularly offensive were two occasions when he burned the Croatian national flag at public places 
in Belgrade in April and August 2015 (Poznatov, 2015  and B92net,  2015 ) and his insult against the Croatian 
parliamentary delegation when he during an official visit to Serbia’s Parliamentarians trampled the Croatian flag in 
the Serbian Parliamentary building in May  2018 (Rudic, 2018a). 
29 On another occasion, after President Grabar-Kitarović awarded the medals to the two retired Croatian generals 
who had been charged (but finally acquitted) by the International Court in The Hague with war crimes against Serbs 
during Operation Storm at the 2018 celebration of the anniversary of the event, Vulin stated: ‘Croatia has a problem 






leadership with his statements on unsustainability of present B-H and the desire of 
Bosnian Serbs to secede from this country (and join Serbia) as soon as the 
‘international factors allow’ (Inserbia.info., 2015; Srpska Times, 2018), Dodik’s 
rhetoric and even some of his concrete actions in this regard30 have so far marginally 
affected both the B-H political status quo established by the Dayton agreement and 
relations between the Serbian government and the Bosniak leadership. Considering 
the existence of strong interests among political elites in both countries to maintain 
peace and attain progress in meeting the criteria for EU accession on one side, and the 
strong EU commitment to preserving ‘Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina’, it is very hard to 
believe that Serbia’s relations with B-H may deteriorate to a level where they would 
pose an issue in Serbia’s accession negotiations. This seems to be further assured after 
the EU launched the so-called ‘Berlin process’ in 2014 which focused on ‘a broad 
reform agenda,’ rather than constitutional changes in B-H (Juncos and Withman, 
2015) and has already shown some signs of (slightly) improving cooperation among 
the political leaders of all three ethnic groups at all levels of government.31 However, 
the same cannot be said for the significant increase in political ‘incidents’ between the 
governing political elites in Serbia and Croatia over the last several years, which, 
combined with the fact that Croatia as an EU member has the power to bloc (or at least 
obstruct) progress in Serbia’s accession negotiations, may become a serious hurdle for 
the latter’s accession ambitions.  
After it seemed that tensions between the two countries had (to some extent) calmed 
in early February 2015, when the International Court of Justice dismissed their 
respective claims of genocide committed during the war in the 1990s (BBC News, 
2015a), only a few weeks later the Croatian delegation to the European Parliament 
attempted to prevent the adoption of the resolution on the opening of accession 
negotiations with Serbia. Although Croatia’s amendment that Serbia change the 
country’s law on the prosecution of war criminals and stop prosecuting its non-citizens 
according to this law before it would be allowed to open the first accession chapters 
was criticised by the representatives of the European Commission, and was rejected 
(in its original form) by the Parliament (EuroActive, 2015), in Serbia it was perceived 
as a direct obstruction of Serbia’s accession bid. However, the Croatian government 
and its representatives in EU institutions have continued to insist that this and other 
                                                      
30 Particularly provocative was the organisation of a referendum in September 2017 regarding the viability of the 
Bosnia and Hercegovina’s Constitutional Court’s ban of the celebration of the 9th January as a national holiday in 
Republica Srpska due to negative associations which it may raise among the non-Serbian/Christian Orthodox 
residents of RS (as 9 January is also a Serbian Orthodox religious holiday and the day on which RS was established 
in 1992 may raise). Although the same Court also banned the referendum from taking place and  despite the strong 
objections of the Bosniak and  (Western) international communities who feared that this referendum would be just 
a precursor to a referendum on the independence of RS, the referendum was held and 99 per cent of those who cast 
their votes (some 56 per cent of total RS population) supported the Republika Srpska authorities in rejecting the B-
H Constitutional Court’s denunciation of the 9 January holiday (Deutsche Welle, 2016; BBCNews, 2016). However, 
nothing has substantially changed since then. The Republika Srpska authorities have continued to celebrate the 9th 
of January as they used to (though without the presence of the special guard of the B-H Army which has been 
replaced with the special guard of the RS police – see e.g. Radio Free Europe, 2018), and to occasionally have harsh 
rhetorical exchanges with the Bosniak political leadership (MacDowal, 2017). Yet all the federal B-H institutions 
and the institutions of the two entities have continued to work as they had before this referendum and there have 
not been any official calls for a referendum on the independence of RS either. 
31 After the EU council initiated in December 2014 (EU Foreign Affairs Council, 2014) a focus on the solution of 
the “outstanding socio-economic challenges[Bosnia and Herzegovina] faces” (European Commission 2015, p. 4) 
instead of changes to its constitutional order which the EU unsuccessfully insisted on for years (but was strongly 
opposed by Bosnian Serbs and Croats) the “Reform Agenda for Bosnia and Herzegovina 2015 – 2018” and some 
common reform actions by all three levels of the government of B-H were adopted already in July 2015 (Delegation 
of the European Union…, 2015, see also Petrovic, 2017). 
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‘open issues’ in bilateral relations between the two countries 32  ought to influence 
Serbia’s progress in accession, even after Serbia was ‘allowed’ to open its first two 
accession negotiations chapters in December of the same year. 
In early April 2016, an EU Council working group decided against debating Serbia’s 
opening of accession Chapters 23 and 24 (dealing with the rule of law, the judiciary 
and human rights) from its agenda after Croatia failed to agree to it for the same 
reasons (listed above) which it used to object the adoption of the European parliament 
resolution in March 2015 (Euractiv, 12 April 2016). Then in December the same year 
Croatia blocked the opening of chapter 26 (on education and culture) over issues 
related to the Croat minority in Serbia and the return of cultural goods (Zaba, 2016). 
While Croatia (pressured by more influential EU members) later agreed that all these 
problematic chapters could be opened,33 at the time of writing, nearly three years after 
the EU opened the first accession negotiation chapters with Serbia, it is obvious that 
these negotiations will not be supported nor assisted by the governing political elite in 
Croatia. Therefore, the words of President Josipović, spoken when Croatia became an 
EU member on 1 July 2013, that Croatia ‘hope[s and will assist] its neighbours [to] also 
complete this journey, as quickly as possible’ (Pavelić, 2013), and repeated on many 
occasions by his successor President Grabar Kitarović and by Croatian Prime 
ministers, can only be considered ‘polite rhetoric’ in the context of Serbia’s EU 
accession.  
This, however, is not surprising considering the extensive issues in relations between 
the two countries discussed in the previous section. The above elaborated examples of 
Croatia’s actions to block progress in Serbia’s accession negotiations, taken together 
with the previous experience of Croatia and of some other EU member states in dealing 
with disputes with neighbours (Geddes and Taylor, 2016) particularly the ongoing 
border dispute between Croatia and Slovenia,34 signals that Croatia may pose a serious 
obstacle for Serbia’s accession. While it is hard to believe that Croatia would be able to 
copy the Greek pattern regarding Macedonia’s accession,35 it would definitely be able 
to significantly slow down and delay many administrative procedures and processes 
related to the accession negotiation process. If they want their country to continue 
progressing in the EU accession process, it seems that Serbian political leaders will 
need to take the ‘Croatian factor’ more seriously, particularly when trying to maintain 
a ‘tough stance’ and send ‘strong messages’ to their Croatian counterparts on any single 
issue and ‘opportunity’ that arises. 
Conclusions 
While the improvement or, more precisely, establishment of official relations with 
Kosovo via the signing of the ‘binding agreement’ remains the key pre-condition for 
the successful completion of Serbia’s accession negotiations, its perpetually difficult 
                                                      
32 From the ‘precise identification’ of all undentified Croats among 2,000 missing persons from the 1990s war, and 
the treatment of the Croatian ethnic minority in Serbia, to the disputed property and international borders between 
the two countries along the Danube river (see e.g. Dinić, 2015 and Kmezić, 2016). 
33 Chapters 23 and 24 were opened on 18 July, and chapter 26 was opened together with chapter 20 on 26 February 
2017 (see EU Commission web site, 2018) 
34 After years of unsuccessful attempts to find a compromise solution for its border disputes in the Adriatic Sea, 
Slovenia and Croatia agreed to accept the international arbitration. However after the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration issued a binding ruling in June 2017, Croatia’s authorities refused to implement it and continued the 
dispute with Slovenia (Vladisavljevic, 2018). 
35 Greece has, due to the ‘name issue,’ blocked any progress in Macedonia’s accession to the EU for nearly 14 years 





relations with the Djukanovic governments in Montenegro, the Bosniak political 
leaders in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia’s political elite may also pose serious 
problems for its bid to join the EU. Although the major causes of problems in Serbia’s 
relations with these neighbours are grounded in domestic factors, mainly related to the 
legacies of the violent dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, the EU also bears a certain 
degree of responsibility, particularly for the persistent longevity of some of these 
problems. Especially damaging in this regard was the EU’s policy of prioritising 
regional and national political stability (as it was understood and defined in related EU 
policy incentives and actions), rather than democratic standards in the respective 
countries. Instead of stabilising the domestic political scene, the EU’s years long 
insistence on the centralisation of B-H’s constitution (which had zero chance of being 
consensually adopted by all three major ethnic groups as required by this same 
constitution) and its persistent support of Djukanovic’s (semi-)authoritarian rule in 
Montenegro have sharpened ethnic divisions in the former and cemented political 
tensions and intolerance in the latter. This, as well as the EU’s inability to ‘do 
something’ about the increased right-wing nationalism (strongly related to anti-
Serbism) in Croatia and a deterioration of respect for democratic standards and the 
rule of law in Serbia itself in recent years (see the Introduction and Markovic’s and 
Kovacevic’s contributions to this volume) could not have helped overcoming problems 
in Serbia’s relations with any of these countries. 
On the other hand, the EU’s pressure, together with strong commitment from its 
officials, particularly the High Representative Mogherini (who personally chairs the 
Brussels talks between the two presidents) and Commissioner Hahn, on both Serbia 
and Kosovo to try to find common ground has shown that the EU still can ‘do 
something’ if it really wants and if it is ready to consider ‘the rational interests of 
domestic actors’ (Börzel, 2018, p. 124). Despite all odds and the seriousness of the 
disputes and misunderstandings expressed at the Brussels talks as discussed in this 
paper, thanks to their strong mutual interests and strong EU support, the Serbian and 
Kosovo governments (or more precisely their presidents) have been able to come close 
to an agreement which would directly lead to a serious improvement of their relations. 
This seems to be the (only) formula for solving the ‘regional disputes’ that the EU has 
asked Serbia (and its Western Balkan neighbours) to solve ‘as a matter of urgency’, 
including those which Serbia has with Croatia and which may eventually appear to be 
more challenging for Serbia’s accession than its ‘arch problem’ with Kosovo.   
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